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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
VCS, INC., a Utah Corporation,

Appellate Case No. 20110062-SC

Plaintiff and Appellant,

Trial Court No. 080901677

Va.

LA SALLE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company,
AMERICA WEST BANK, a Utah limited
liability company, UTAH COMMUNITY
BANK, a Utah Corporation, and DOES 110,
Defendants and Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT VCS, INC.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)G).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the trial court err in interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 3 8-1 -11 (3)?
Standard of Review: The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the
district court's legal conclusions. Gutierrez v. Medley, 975 P.2d 913 (Utah 1998).

1
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Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record at the
following locations: R. at 301-10, 560-62, 564-66; Transcript of Hearing of 20
September 2010, R. at 711, pp. 6-9, 53, 66-77.
Did the trial err in voiding VCS, Inc.'s lien against Utah Community Bank and
America West Bank despite VCS, Inc.'s substantial compliance with the
provisions of Utah's mechanic's lien law?
Standard of Review: In reviewing a determination of summary judgment, an
appellate court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and gives
no particular deference to that court's view of the law. Ron Case Roofing &
Asphalt Paving Inc. v. Blomquist, 111* P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). The proper
interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law which is reviewed
for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions.
Gutierrez v. Medley, 975 P.2d 913 (Utah 1998).
Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record at the
following locations: R. at 564-65, 651-52; Transcript of Hearing of 20 September
2010, R. at 711, pp. 17-19, 24-25, 53, 82-83.
Did the trial court err in ruling that VCS, Inc.'s amended complaint did not relate
back under Rule 15(a) for the purposes of the filing date?
Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a district court's interpretation of
a rule of procedure for correctness. Edwards v. Powder Ml Water & Sewer, 2009
UT App. 185 (Utah 2009) In reviewing a determination of summary judgment, an
appellate court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and gives
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
2 may contain errors.

no particular deference to that court's view of the law. Ron Case Roofing &
Asphalt Paving Inc. v. Blomquist, 173 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989).
Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved at the following locations:
R. at 563-64, 650-51; Transcript of Hearing of 20 September 2010, R. at 711, pp.
6,40,43.
Did the trial court err in ruling that Utah Community Bank had not been unjustly
enriched by VCS, Inc.?
Standard of Review: "Whether a claimant has been unjustly enriched is a mixed
question of law and fact. . ." Desert Miriah, Inc., v. B &LAuto, Inc., 12 P..3d
580, 582 (Utah 2000). As such, it will be reversed if clearly erroneous. Id.
Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record at the
following pages: R. at 311-12; 566-68, 652-53; Transcript of Hearing of 20
September 2010, R. at 711, pp. 5, 29-34, 45-49, 62-66, 83.
5. Did the trial court err in determining that VCS, Inc.'s service of process on La
Salle was inadequate to sustain a default judgment?
Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a district court's interpretation of
a rule of procedure for correctness. Edwards v. Powder Mt. Water & Sewer, 2009
UTApp. 185 (Utah 2009).
Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record at the
following pages: R. at 106-13; Transcript of Hearing of 16 April 2009, R. at 710,
pp. 3-57.
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Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central important to the appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(2)03) - "Substantial compliance with the requirements of this
chapter is sufficient to hold and claim a lien." Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(2)(b) (2007).
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-9 - "(1) The recorder must record the claim in an index
maintained for that purpose. (2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all persons
are considered to have notice of the claim." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-9 (2011).
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l ( l ) ( a ) "(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Owner" is as defined in Section 38-11-102.
(b) "Residence" is as defined in Section 3 8-11 -102.
(2) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter: (a)
except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), within 180 days after the day on which the lien
claimant filed a notice of claim under Section 38-1-7; or (b) if an owner files for
protection under the bankruptcy laws of the United States before the expiration of the
180-day period under Subsection (2)(a), within 90 days after the automatic stay under the
bankruptcy proceeding is lifted or expires.
(3) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (2) the lien claimant shall
file for record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a
notice of the pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title
or right to possession of real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who
have been made parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
4 may contain errors.

commencement of the action, (b) The burden of proof is upon the lien claimant and those
claiming under the lien claimant to show actual knowledge under Subsection (3)(a).

1

(4) (a) A lien filed under this chapter is automatically and immediately void if an action
to enforce the lien is not filed within the time required by this section, (b)
Notwithstanding Section 78B-2-111, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate a lien that becomes void under Subsection (4)(a)." Utah Code Ann. §38-111(1-4) (2011).

<

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
The underlying case is a claim by a general contractor to collect for services and
materials provided to a subdivision development through lien, breach of contract, and
unjust enrichment claims. General contractor Plaintiff/Appellants VCS, Inc. (hereinafter
"VCS"), brought suit against developer Defendant/Appellee La Salle Development, LLC

,

(hereinafter "La Salle") and against two banks, Defendants/ Appellees Utah Community
Bank and FDIC as receiver for America West Bank (hereinafter "UCB", "FDIC" or
i

collectively "the Banks").
Course of the Proceedings Below:
VCS filed suit on 12 March 2008 in the Second Judicial District Court, Weber

<

County, Ogden Department. The Honorable Judge Michael Direda was assigned to the
case. VCS5 suit alleged four (4) causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) lien
i

foreclosure; (3) declaratory relief regarding priority of interests to the real property; and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(4) quasi contract-unjust enrichment. (R. at 1-10; 177-208; 231-63.) The first cause of
action for breach of contract was against La Salle alone. The second and third causes of
action, namely to foreclose its lien and determine the priority of the lien claimants, i.e.
the priority of the bank versus VCS' mechanics' lien, was against all three Defendants.
The fourth cause of action for quasi contract-unjust enrichment was also against all three
Defendants.
VCS initially filed suit only against La Salle and obtained a default judgment after
serving the registered agent of La Salle. In a ruling on 27 April 2009 the Court set aside
the judgment as void under Rule 60(c) because it found Plaintiff failed to serve La Salle
(allegedly because the registered agent's secretary, who acknowledged in writing she
could accept for the agent, was not La Salle's secretary, but that of the registered agent's
personal business). After the default judgment was set aside, VCS amended its complaint
and added the Banks as Defendants. On 30 March 2010 VCS brought a summary
judgment motion seeking judgment on its causes of action against La Salle and the Banks
under it various theories. (R. at 288-508.) On 15 April and 28 April 2010 the Banks
brought cross motions for summary judgment. (R. at 509-552.) La Salle failed to
respond to the Plaintiff s motions.
Disposition By Trial Court:
In a ruling dated 26 October 2010 the Trial Court declared VCS's lien void and
granted the banks cross motions for summary judgment. (R. at 646.) It also denied
Plaintiffs motion as to its claims against the Banks, but granted its motion with respect to
Plaintiffs breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims against La Salle. (R. at 644Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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55, 689-91.) On 14 December 2010 the Trial Court granted VCS's motion for summary
judgment against La Salle for breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the amount of

,

$218,948.50, but failed to declare VCS's lien valid and order foreclosure of its lien. (R.
at 689-91.) The Trial Court granted the Banks' motions for summary judgment against
VCS and awarded the Banks attorney's fees. (R. at 644-55; 682-88.) The final judgment
appealed from was entered on 14 December 2010. VCS filed a timely Notice of Appeal
{

on 12 January 2011.

Statements of Fact:
FACTS RELATED TO LIEN LAW AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
1.

Tom Phelps is the owner and operator of VCS, Inc. ("VCS"), a Utah Corporation
and at all times relevant herein Tom Phelps ("Phelps") was a licensed general
contractor in the state of Utah. (R. at 317.)

2.

In March 2006, Phelps was contacted by Kyle Lind ("Lind"), a principle and

(

owner of Defendant La Salle Development, LLC ("La Salle"), who asked VCS to
access and bid the completion of a subdivision called Northpark Meadows (aka
North Park Meadows), located at approximately 600 E. 4th N. in Ogden, Utah.
(R. at 317-18, 645.)
3.

La Salle owned nineteen (19) vacant lots in the subdivision, comprising lots 5-8,

<

10-22 and lots 31 and 32 of North Park Meadows. (R. at 318, 344, 645.)

i
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4.

After obtaining the subcontractor bids, VCS submitted a complete bid to La Salle
to complete the infrastructure and home construction for the nineteen lots, which
bid was accepted. (R. at 318.)

5.

VCS and La Salle entered into a written agreement, prepared by Don Hampton of
La Salle, on 22 February 2007. The combined total expected compensation to
VCS for the entire project was $192,815.00. (R. at 347-51.)

6.

By October 2006, VCS obtained approval from the city to begin work. (R. at
319.)

7.

Approximately the first week of November 2006 work began on the project,
including, but not limited to, construction and installation of storm drain,
underground detention basin, concrete sidewalk, French drain, silt fence, etc. and
all the improvements necessary to complete the infrastructure of the subdivision.
(R. at 319, 645.)

8.

On 12 January 2007 Defendant Utah Community Bank recorded a trust deed dated
9 January 2007 and La Salle received its first loan for the acquisition and
development of the project. (R. at 645.)

9.

VCS began home construction in 2007 on four lots, Lots 19-22, for which VCS
had obtained building permits. (R. at 320, 354-55.)

10.

A Notice of Commencement was filed with the Utah State Contractor Registry for
the residence construction. (R. at 358-63.)

11.

VCS, Inc. did not receive any payment from La Salle pursuant to their agreement.
(R. at 320-21.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In approximately April 2007 VCS and Defendant Utah Community Bank
entered in a written contract that VCS would continue to act as the general

,

contractor for the project in the event that La Salle failed its obligations to the
bank. (R. at 321.) Utah Community Bank failed to refute that there was a
i

written contract in its response to VCS's Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
at 512-535.) (Plaintiffs Statement of Fact No. 15 and Phelps Second Affidavit No.
19-20 was not refuted and is therefore deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7 of the

{

Rules of Civil Procedure).
In September 2007 VCS was orally terminated by La Salle, despite being onbudget and ahead of schedule. (R. at 320, 645.)
After La Salle received funding from UCB in January 2007, Utah Community
Bank: (1) was aware that VCS was working on the project; (2) was aware the VCS
was conferring a substantial benefit to La Salle and to the bank, who had a security
interest in the property receiving improvements; (3) had insecurity about La

{

Salle's ability to make payments and suspected it would have to foreclose on the
property; (4) knew it would have to pay VCS for its work on the project; (5) knew
that VCS expected payment; (6) knew that its loan proceeds were used to pay for
ongoing improvements; (7) kept a Tracking Log of the loan line items and
expenses/invoices/costs for the project; and (8) knew that VCS was intimately
involved in the project and was submitting invoices and/or draws for work done
by it or its subcontractors as the work was completed on the project. (R. at 31921,338,341,472-78,649.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

15.

VCS' last day of substantial work was September 15, 2007. (R. at 3205 646.)

16.

America West Bank obtained interest in lots 31 and 32 on 24 October 2007. (R. at
493-99,645.)

17.

VCS filed a lien on 29 January 2008 for worked performed on all nineteen (19)
lots. The lien was for $1,000.00 per lots 3-18 and 31 and 32, and $17,987.25 per
lot for lots 19-22, as well as fees, costs and other amounts due and owing, for a
total of $88,949.00. (R. at 334-35, 366-67, 645-46.)

18.

VCS provided notice of the lien filed to La Salle and to La Salle's registered
agent, Ted Madsen, via U.S. Mail. The notice was sent out February 1, 2008 by
certified mail, and was returned with the signature of Ted Madsen, as registered
agent, and signed by someone on behalf of La Salle. (R. at 321, 370-71.)

19.

The Banks had record notice of the lien as of 29 January 2008 pursuant to U.C.A.
§38-1-9.

20.

Plaintiff filed suit on 12 March 2008. (R. at 1-11, 645-46.) See also Online
Docket, case no. 080901677. The suit contained the lien recovery fund
application forms for application to the fund. (R. at 177, 231, 415-42.)

21.

On 6 June 2008 Plaintiff obtained a default judgment for $90,176.50. (R. at 321,
370-71.)

22.

On 24 September 2008 VCS filed a Notice of Judgment Lien with the court and
county recorder. (R. at 21-22.)

23.

On 26 January 2009 Defendant La Salle filed a motion to set aside the judgment.
(R. at 68-93.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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24.

On 16 April 2008 the court heard oral argument and determined it would set aside
the default judgment, which final order was signed on 27 April 2009. (R. at 210,

,

645.)
25.

On 16 October 2008 VCS sent a letter to the UCB and FDIC (at the time, America
West Bank) informing them of the judgment against La Salle and requesting that
they stipulate to priority. (R. at 645.)

26.

On 21 April 2009 VCS amended its complaint to correct the contract damages

<

claim and add claims for declaratory relief and unjust enrichment, and
simultaneously added party Defendants America West Bank and Utah Community
Bank. (R. at 645.) VCS subsequently amended its complaint again on 18
December 2009. (R. at 177, 231.)
27.

On 24 April 2009 VCS filed a lis pendens with the Weber County Recorder's

*

office. (R. at 445-47, 645.)
28.

On 30 December 2009 Utah Community Bank became the owner of Lots 5-8, and

{

10-22 pursuant to a foreclosure sale on a Trust Deed from La Salle. (R. at 450-52,
502-03,645.)
29.

UCB obtained ownership to these seventeen (17) lots directly from La Salle (who
was a party to the lawsuit within 180 days from the date VCS filed its lien) and at
a time when UCB had actual knowledge of the suit because it and La Salle were

<

already parties to the action. (R. at 450-52, 502-03, 645.)
30.

FDIC is not the owner of lots 31 and 32, but upon information and belief,
i

continues to hold a Trust Deed to these lots, (see generally, R. at 645.)
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31.

On 14 December 2010 VCS obtained a judgment against La Salle in the amount of
$218,948.50 for unjust enrichment. (R. at 689-91.)

FACTS RELATED TO SERVICE OF PROCESS
32.

La Salle's registered agent on March 19, 2008, was Ted A. Madsen. (R. at 209.)

33.

On March 19, 2008, VCS served La Salle by leaving a copy of the Summons,
Notice of Mechanic's Lien, Military Service Affidavit and Complaint with a
receptionist of La Salle's registered agent, Ted Madsen. VCS's Process server,
Rosemari Green, served receptionist Cailey Tonks, who acknowledged on the
Summons in her own handwriting, "For Registered Agent Ted Madsen." (R. at
209,12-13,384-85,388-89.)

34.

Ms. Tonks was not associated with La Salle. (R. at 209-10.)

35.

Process server, Rosemari Green, who had been in business for nineteen years at
that time, had a processing policy and business practice when serving a summons
and complaint upon a registered agent of a company to specifically ask for the
registered agent whose name is on the summons. If he/she are not available to
accept service of the same, she asks if the receptionist/secretary or person in
charge if they are authorized to accept service on behalf of the registered agent.
(R. at 384-85.)

36.

Ms. Honks provided no affidavit. Counsel proffered "I don't remember". R. at
710, p. 11-12.
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37.

Registered agent Ted Madsen could not remember if he received the complaint
and allegedly did not provide the complaint to La Salle. (R. at 210.) Mr. Madsen

{

could not recall if he received the September 2008 lien sent to him by mail. Id.
38.

La Salle alleged no knowledge of the suit until December 2008, upon receipt of a
i

writ of execution by VCS. Id.
39.

La Salle failed to answer the complaint follow service on its registered agent.

40.

Kyle Lind is a non-party who, upon information and belief, has an interest in La

<

Salle. Rick Sorensen is a Utah attorney who represents non-party Kyle Lind in
several other suits pending in Utah courts and in which VCS, Inc. is also a party.
(R. at 402.)
41.

After service of the Summons and Complaint upon Defendant, La Salle
Development, LLC, attorney for VCS, Inc., H. Thomas Stevenson, spoke with
Rick Sorensen, attorney for Kyle Lind, and on two occasions asked if he
represented La Salle Development. Rick Sorensen told H. Thomas Stevenson in
both instances that he did not represent La Salle Development, LLC. At no time
has Mr. Sorensen indicated to H. Thomas Stevenson that he represents La Salle
Development, LLC. Id.

42.

On two occasions, Tom Phelps, Terrence Neal, attorney Tom Stevenson,
representing VCS, Inc., Kyle Lind, and Rick Sorensen, attorney for Kyle Lind,
met at the offices of Stevenson & Smith. (R. at 405-07, 410-12.)

43.

On one of these occasions, which occurred shortly after serving La Salle registered
agent in March 2008, but before June 6, 2008, when VCS obtained its default
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judgment, the parties discussed all the complaints that had been filed by VCS, Inc.
and/or Tom Phelps against Kyle Lind and/or his associated entities. Id.
44.

With regard to an action titled VCS v. Lind et al. (the Bearlake matter) which is in
First District Court, Tom Stevenson, representing VCS, Inc., granted an openended extension to Kyle Lind and the associated entities who were Defendants in
that action. Id.

45.

With regard to the VCS, Inc. v. La Salle matter, Rick Sorensen and Kyle Lind
acknowledged that they knew about the complaint, however, Rick Sorensen stated,
"I do not represent La Salle Development at this time, however, I may in the
future.1' Id.

46.

Following this statement, Kyle Lind stated that his partner, Don Hampton, may
"do something stupid like on the last one." Id.

47.

This statement by Kyle Lind is in reference to the fact that Don Hampton had
responded to a prior complaint by United Contractors without having talked to
their attorneys. Id.

48.

Kyle Lind knew about the complaint that was received and which had been served
on his registered agent, but Kyle Lind!s attorney, Rick Sorensen, indicated that he
was not representing Defendant, La Salle Development, in the matter. Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This appeal concerns whether the court erred: 1) in interpreting Utah Code Ann. §
38-1-11(3) in such a way as to make the exclusion apply to the 180-day period; 2) in
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finding that VCS had not substantially complied with the Utah's mechanic's lien law; 3)
in ruling that VCS, Inc.'s amended complaint did not relate back under Rule 15(a) to the
filing date; 4) in ruling that the Banks had not been unjustly enriched by VCS's work on
the property; and 5) in determining that VCS's service of process on La Salle was
inadequate to sustain a default judgment.
The Trial Court found that the language of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-11, requiring
that a lis pendens be filed within 180 days of the lien filing was ambiguous and unclear.
As a result it looked to the courts for an interpretation of the statute. The Supreme Court
has not passed upon the issue and the reasoning from two important Appellate Court
decisions lead to different results. VCS's reading of the current statute, namely that the
180 day time period does not apply to the exceptions, i.e. to parties named in the suit or
parties with actual knowledge of the suit, is a reasonable conclusion from reading the
plain language of the statute. While the Defendant Banks have another interpretation of
the statute, only VCS's view comports with the expressed intent of the statute to protect
mechanics work.
Because of the definition of an owner, and the lien law directive that only an
owner needs to receive notice of a lien, and the fact the Section 38-1-11 is silent on how
to handle suits to determine priority among other interest holders after resolving the
validity of a lien against the property owner, is it questionable whether this subsection to
anyone but an owner of the property. In the alternative, the Court could follow the
Butterfield court's reasoning, namely, that since the Banks acquired the property tiirough
La Salle, an entity who was timely added as an original party to the suit within the 180
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day statutory period, the lien follows the sale and the Banks therefore did not take the
property without notice. Butterfield Lumber Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Corp., 815 P.2d
1330 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Even the public policy arguments behind the statute~to
protect materialmen and laborers, and the policy behind the lis pendens requirement—
namely to prevent the creation of BFPs without notice—is still met by finding that VCS
complied with the statute. The Defendant Banks are not prejudiced in the least in this
case because they had knowledge of the suit ten (10) weeks after the 180 day period.
The purpose behind Section 38-1-1 l's lis pendens and 180 time period
requirement is to prevent innocent buyers from buying property without notice of a
pending action. Section 38-1-9 already provides that the notice of lien imputes notice to
any potential buyer. To the extent 38-1-11 requires more than this, it only lets the
potential buyer know there is also a suit, which information they could get simply by
calling the lien claimant if there was a question. If a lis pendens is filed, innocent
potential buyers will have notice of the pending litigation. However, in this case the lien
was on title before the suit was filed, and the Banks never sold their interest in their
property to anyone but themselves. Therefore, there is no bona fide purchaser problem,
and no issue of notice when they themselves became the owner of the property. Further,
there is a question about whether a non-owner has the right to challenge a procedurally or
substantively defective lien because the statute is silent on this point. Under these
circumstances the Trial Court erred in finding that the 180-day deadline is a bar to
maintaining a lien.
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If the Court interprets Section 38-1-11 to require a lis pendens be filed within the
180-day period regardless of who challenges the lien claimant, i.e that it is inviolate, VCS

{

still has a valid lien because of the doctrine of substantial compliance, declared by this
Court and as codified under Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7. In 2006 the legislature amended
i

this section to ensure the doctrine applied to then entire mechanics' lien chapter, not just
to the subsection. The Court erroneously found that the lis pendens was not a mere
technicality, but instead a jurisdictional requirement. There is no basis in the code or

(

legislative history for this finding and it contradicts the law's intent to protect
materialmen and labors. The Court further found that VCS's amended complaints did not
relate back to the date of its original pleading, despite the identity of interest the Banks
had with the property because of their Trust Deeds, and despite how early in the process
the lawsuit was.
The Trial Court also erred in dismissing VCS's unjust enrichment claim on the
grounds that its failure to perfect its lien against the Banks deprived the Court of
jurisdiction over the issue, despite the fact that VCS had a valid lien against the owner,
La Salle. There were substantial disputes facts regarding Utah Community Bank's
knowledge of VCS's actions, including an undisputed fact regarding a written contract
between the Bank to pay VCS to complete the subdivision if La Salle did not.
Finally, the Trial Court erred when it found that service was ineffective on LaSalle
when its registered agent's assistant expressly agreed she had authority to accept service
on his behalf. For these reasons VCS respectfully request that the Appellate Court
reverse the court below.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

<

ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred When It Interpreted Utah Code Annotated § 38-111(3) To Void VCS's Lien As Against The Banks For Failure To Timely File
A Lis Pendens When The Banks Never Owned The Property Until After
Being Named To The Suit And Where The Banks Obtained Their Ownership
Through La Salle, Who Was Timely Made A Party To The Lawsuit

A.

VCS is Entitled to Lien Foreclosure of Lots 5-8,10-22 and 31 and 32 to
Satisfy Its Mechanic's Lien.
Under Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 contractors such as VCS are entitled to file a

lien for improvements to property. U.C.A. § 38-1-3 (2009). The term improvement
encompasses installation of infrastructure, such as sewer and water systems on property,
as well as construction of residences. First of Denver Mtg. Investors v. C.N. Zundel &
Assocs., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979). The purpose of this statute "is to provide protection
to those who enhance the value of a property by supplying labor or materials." AAA
Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. and Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986). The law
is intended for the benefit of those who perform labor and supply materials. Totorica v.
Thomas, 397 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah 1965). In order to achieve this purpose, Utah courts
construe the statute broadly. Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386
(Utah 1982). A valid mechanic's lien is created where, as here, a contract is repudiated
after work has commenced or after materials have been furnished. U.C.A. § 38-11 l(l)(a)(2)(D); Garland v. Bear Lake & River Waterworks & Irrigation Co., 9 Utah 350,
34 P. 368 (1893), affd, 164 U.S. 1, 17 S. Ct. 7, 41 L. Ed. 327 (1896).
For VCS to establish that it has a valid lien it must show:
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(1)

it filed a lien within 180 days of the "last date on which substantial work
was performed under the original contract". U.C.A. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i)(A)

and (ii)(D) (2009).
(2)

it filed an action to enforce the lien within 180 days from the day it filed a
notice of claim under Section 38-1-7. U.C.A. § 38-1-11(2).

(3)

it did one of the following: a) filed a notice of the action with the county
recorder within 180 days, b) included the owner of the property as a party
to the action, or c) provided actual knowledge of the commencement of the
action to the owner of the property. Id. at (3)(a).

(4)

that it delivered or mailed by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to
the reputed or record owner of the real property. Id. (3)(a) and (c).

Requirements 1,2, and 4 above are easily dispensed with. The last substantial
work completed by VCS was on September 15, 2007. VCS filed a lien on lots 3-22 and
lots 31 and 32 on 29 January 2008, which was less than 180 days from the date of the last
substantial work completed. The lien amount was for a total of $88,949.00. This satisfies
requirement No. 1 above. VCS filed suit against the property owner, Defendant La Salle,
on 12 March 2008, which was less than 180 days from the date the lien was filed. This
satisfies requirement No. 2 above. The lien was mailed to the property owner and to its
registered agent by certified mail on February 1, 2008, which is well within 180 days
from the date the lien was recorded, 29 January 2008. Therefore Plaintiff may be
awarded his attorney's fees and costs for enforcing its mechanic's lien under the statute.
There are a host of other requirements concerning the content of these notices, none of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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which are disputed by any of the Defendants. The real dispute in this case concerns the
third requirement above and the interpretation of the statutory language.
While a lis pendens of the proceeding was not filed until April 2009, the statute
does not require VCS to provide this notice against a Defendant to the lawsuit. U.C.A. §
38-1-11(3): Projects Unlimited Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.. 1990, 798 P.2d
738 (only when mechanic's lienor fails to timely record lis pendens can a Defendant
argue that it is not subject to mechanic's lien, and then only if such person was not named
as party to foreclosure action and did not have actual knowledge of action). At the time
of filing the lien and foreclosure suit, the owner of the property was Defendant La Salle, a
party to the action. Therefore, No. 3 above is satisfied as to La Salle.
Not only was La Salle listed as a party, it also had actual knowledge of the suit.
Under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure service of process is effective by
delivering the summons and complaint to an "officer, a managing or general agent, or
other agent authorized by appointment or by law". Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 4(d)(1)(E)
(2008). In this case the process server, Rose Green, served Defendant La Salle on 19
March 2008. Ms. Green had a business practice of first inquiring if the person is the
registered agent and second, if they were not, requesting to know if the person could
accept process for the Registered Agent. Ms. Cailey Tonks, the registered agent's
assistant, expressly stated she would accept service and even wrote the words, "FOR
REGISTERED AGENT TED MADSEN" on the front sheet of the Summons below her
signature.
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Receptionists can have implied authority to accept service of process where that
receptionist stated they could accept the summons. Kuhlik v. Atlantic Corp., 112 F.R.D.
146 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc.,
840 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir.1988) (finding service on receptionist effective where
corporation was comparatively small and the role played by receptionist was
proportionally large, and receptionist was the only one in the office when the process
server arrived, indicating that she possessed more than minimal responsibility);
Koninkliike Luchtvaart Maat-Schappii N.V. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 17 F.R.D. 49, 51
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding face-to-face encounter with corporate officer not required to
effect service where the officer's receptionist accepted service, promised to deliver the
papers to the proper person, and did in fact deliver the papers). All the current rule
requires is that the person be "authorized" or a "general agent". Utah R. Civ. P., Rule
4(d)(1)(E) (2008). Ms. Tonks' written statement satisfies this Rule. Registered agents
have a duty to "forward to the represented entity . . . any process, notice, or demand that
is served on the agent." U.C.A. §16-17-302(1) (2008).
In addition, in a meeting between La Salle and VCS and their respective counsel,
held between March 12, 2008, when the complaint was filed, and June 6, 2008, when the
default was entered, La Salle acknowledged receipt and knowledge of the complaint
during a meeting between officers of La Salle and VCS. The parties present were Kyle
Lind, officer for La Salle, Rick Sorensen, La Salle's current attorney, Tom Stevenson,
VCS' attorney, and Terrance Neal and Tom Phelps, officers of VCS. Kyle Lind
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acknowledged in that meeting that he knew about the La Salle complaint prior to the
default judgment on June 6, 2008.
The fact that 1) the receptionist had implied authority to accept service, 2) she
accepted service, and 3) Kyle Lind acknowledged receipt of the Complaint prior to the
judgment being entered, as proven by at least two affidavits, shows that Defendant La
Salle received the complaint and summons. As noted above, making La Salle a
Defendant in the pending action is enough to satisfy requirement No. 3, even absent this
actual knowledge.1
In December 2009 Defendant Utah Community Bank foreclosed on seventeen of
La Salle's remaining lots. At that time, Utah Community Bank became the record owner,
but took the property subject to any valid liens. See U.C.A. § 38-1-5. Prior to this time,
on 21 April 2009 and 18 December 2009, Plaintiff amended its complaint to add Utah
Community Bank and America West Bank as Defendants. While the lien statutes do not
require Plaintiff to bring the lenders as party-defendants in order to establish that it has a
valid lien against property owner La Salle, these entities were added as Defendants so
that the court could make a determination concerning priority of the encumbrances, not
because of some duty required by the lien statutes. The lien notice requirements do not
apply to these Defendants, even though they had actual and record notice of the action
well prior to becoming owners of the property.
The dispositive question for the Court concerns interpretation of Utah Code
Annotated § 38-1-11(3) in relation to non property owners. Interpreting this section
1

Service of process is the subject of Section V. infra.
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raises numerous questions upon which the statute is silent and which are matters of first
impression to the Utah Supreme Court.
First, who must a lien claimant sue? Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-7 requires that a
lien must be filed against the "owner" of the property and that a notice of claim must be
sent only to the reputed or record owner. It is silent as to whether the notice should or
must be sent to equitable interest holders, such as lenders, or to other known lien
claimants. However, § 38-1-9 expressly imputes record notice to other interest holders
once the lien is filed with the county recorded. It states: "[fjrom the time the claim is
filed for record, all persons are considered to have notice of the claim". Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-1-9 (2011). Therefore, the Banks were imputed knowledge of the notice of claim
before the suit was even instituted. Presumably, if notice must only go to the "owner", it
is logical that the suit for lien foreclosure should only be against that same "owner". The
term owner is defined in § 38-1-11 (and therefore by reference, § 38-11-102) to exclude
lenders who are not actual property owners.
Second, the Court of Appeals found that, in relation to § 38-1-11(3), there are two
competing interests-that of protecting materialmen and laborers, and that of protecting
innocent third party purchasers without notice of a lien foreclosure action. Butterfield
Lumber v. Peterson Mortgage Corporation, 815 P.2d 1330,1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). If
there is no innocent third party purchaser without notice, but the Plaintiff failed to file a
lis pendens, is the lis pendens requirement mandatory where, as here, the Banks are not
prejudiced in any way by being made a party?
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Third, how must a lien claimant determine priority of its interests versus other
interest holders? Priority of liens and interest holders can be accomplished via a
declaratory judgment action and Section 38-1-5 delineates how to determine priority
among interest holders. However, Section 38-1-11 is silent about who to include in the
action. Recording a notice of lien does not establish priority of the claim under this
chapter. E.W. Allen & Assocs. v. FDIC 776 F. Supp. 1504 (D. Utah 1991). Under § 381-5, visible commencement of work, not record notice, establishes priority.
EDSA/CLOWARD. L.L.C. v. Klibanoff 2005 UT App 367, 122 P.3d 646. Must the
valid lien holder bring all interest holders in the original Section 38-1-11 suit, or may it
amend the lien foreclosure suit against the owner to determine priority after having
determined its lien was valid? Or can the lien claimant seek declaratory relief in a
separate suit? Again, here the statute is silent.
Fourth, does the substantial compliance provision in Section 38-1-7, which was
amended in 2006 to expressly apply to the entire Chapter for mechanics' liens (versus
just that subsection), effect the case law predating that change? Does the language of that
section stating that substantial compliance with the chapter is "sufficient to hold and
claim a lien" effect the provisions of Section 38-1-11?
Fifth, is Section 38-1-11(3) jurisdictional or a statute of limitations that Plaintiff
can overcome through relation back under Rule 15?
Sixth, do non-property owners with interests in real property have standing to
challenge the procedural and/or substantive aspects of a lien foreclosure action?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
24may contain errors.

Seventh, must a lis pendens be filed within 180 days of the lien filing whether the
entity is made a party to the lawsuit before becoming the owner of the property?
Eighth, does the fact that a bank conducts a nonjudicial foreclosure sale on a trust
deed held by a party timely added to the lawsuit (i.e. within the 180 days) mean that
whomever bought the property, whether via credit bid or otherwise, is imparted notice of
the suit, even if a lis pendens was not filed within the 180 day period? Because the
statute is silent on these related issues, VCS asks that it be found void for vagueness.
The specific language in question is as follows:
2) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed
under this chapter: (a) except as provided in Subsection
(2)(b), within 180 days after the day on which the lien
claimant filed a notice of claim under Section 38-1 -7; or (b) if
an owner files for protection under the bankruptcy laws of the
United States before the expiration of the 180-day period
under Subsection (2)(a), within 90 days after the automatic
stay under the bankruptcy proceeding is lifted or expires.
(3) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in
Subsection (2) the lien claimant shall file for record with the
county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a
notice of the pendency of the action, in the manner provided
in actions affecting the title or right to possession of real
property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who
have been made parties to the action and persons having
actual knowledge of the commencement of the action, (b)
The burden of proof is upon the lien claimant and those
claiming under the lien claimant to show actual knowledge
under Subsection (3)(a).
U.C.A. § 38-1-11(2) and (3) (2011) (emphasis added).
The Trial Court found the language in § 38-1-11(3) ambiguous and unclear and
therefore found it necessary to look to controlling precedent, stating,
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"[e]ach party has interpreted §38-1-11 (3)(a) based upon the
statute's plain meaning and reached different results: Plaintiff
argues that the exceptions to a void lien—namely, naming a
party in a foreclosure action or proving actual knowledge of
the action—are not subject to the 180 day requirement while
both UCB and FDIC argue that the exceptions are subject to
the time requirement. Because the Court finds that the
language of the statute by itself is unclear as to whether or not
the 180 day requirement applies to the exceptions, the Court
must look at controlling precedent for an interpretation of the
statute.").
(R. at 647.) Ultimately, the Trial Court concluded that the Court of Appeals rulings in
Butterfield and Interlake Distrib., Inc. v. Old Mill Towne, 954 P.2d 1295 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) were dispositive of the issue and declared VCS's lien void. That
interpretation of the statute, namely, to require equitable interest holders be given actual
notice or be named as parties to the action within 180 days, controverts the statute's
purpose of protecting lienholders by allowing equitable interest holders to procedurally
and substantively use the statute as a shield. Furthermore, that result is inconsistent with
those court's findings.
The Butterfield court found that "where the holder of a valid mechanics' lien has
timely begun judicial lien foreclosure proceedings, and a party holding a property interest
that is subject to the lien, aware of the pending foreclosure, disposes of the property to
one who takes it free of the lien the lien attaches to the proceeds gained from the sale."
Butterfield Lumber v. Peterson Mortgage Corporation, 815 P.2d at 1335. In Butterfield
the Peterson Mortgage was timely made a party to the action, and then it sold its interest
to an innocent purchaser without notice of the cause of action. The Plaintiff failed to file
a lis pendens. The court found that the Butterfield lien was enforceable against the third
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party purchaser because it obtained the property from Peterson, who had timely actual
knowledge of the lien action and was a party timely added before the deadline (which at
that time was 12 months from the lien filing). Id.
The facts are the same here. Utah Community Bank obtained its interest in the
property from La Salle, who had timely actual knowledge of the lien action and who was
made a party within the 180 day period. The only difference is how that interest in the
property was obtained. In Butterfield is was through a sale to the third party. In this case
it is through a non-judicial foreclosure sale.
Interlake leads to the same conclusion. In that case the Plaintiff sued lender
Deseret Pacific in October 1985, but never served them. The property owner, Old Mill
Towne defaults and Deseret foreclosed. Old Mill Towne, Inc., a separate entity from Old
Mill Towne, obtained the property in December 1989 and that entity requested to
intervene in the suit in 1991, and was subsequently joined in the suit. The Plaintiff did
not add Old Mill Towne, Inc. as a party and never filed a lis pendens. In that case, the
court concluded that neither Defendant had knowledge of the case within the year
statutory period and found that the lien was void. Interlake, 954 P.2d at 1296. However,
the Interlake decision was in 1988 and Butterfield decision came afterwards in 1991. If
the reasoning in Butterfield is used on the facts of Interlake, the court would have reached
the opposite result. In Interlake, Defendant Old Mill Towne obtained the property from
Deseret, who was a party to the original proceeding, which was filed timely. But Deseret
was not served, a fact not present in the current case. Furthermore, both of these cases
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predate the 2006 change to Utah lien law that made the principle of substantial
compliance applicable to the entire chapter, as discussed in Section II., Infra.
The legislative history and prior versions of the statutes provide little insight as
well. Utah lien law, first enacted in 1898, Utah Code Ann. § 1372 did not contain a lis
pendens requirement as found in the current statute. But U.C.A. § 1391, also enacted at
the same time, required that notice be published in the newspaper to allow other interest
holders to make claims at the hearing on the lien. Id. In 1931 the legislature renumbered
the section as U.C.A. Section 52-1-12/C.L.16 and added the current lis pendens
requirement (but without the current exceptions for parties named and having actual
knowledge), but still continued to require the notice publications. It is unclear when the
publication requirement stopped or whether the lis pendens requirement first began.
VCS's reading of the current statute, namely that the 180 day time period does not
apply to the exceptions, is a reasonable conclusion from reading the plain language of the
statute. In the alternative, the Court can find that the subsection only applies to the
reputed/record owner, not to equitable lien holders. Or, also in the alternative, the Court
could follow the Butterfield court's reasoning, namely that since the Banks acquired the
property through La Salle, who was timely added to the suit within the 180 days, the lien
follows the sale and the Banks therefore did not take the property without notice.
Notwithstanding all these options for allowing the lien to be valid, the public policy
behind the statute (to protect materialmen and laborers) and the policy behind the lis
pendens requirement (namely to prevent the creation of BFPs without notice) is still met
by finding that VCS complied with the statute.
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(

The purpose behind Section 38-1-1 l's lis pendens and 180-day time period
requirement must be to prevent innocent buyers from buying property without notice of a

<

pending action. Section 38-1-9 already provides that the notice of lien imputes notice to
any potential buyer. To the extent 38-1-11 requires more than this, it only lets the
i

potential buyer know there is also a suit, which information they could get simply by
calling the lien claimant if there was a question. If a lis pendens is filed, innocent
potential buyers will have notice of the pending litigation. However, in this case the lien

{

was on title before the suit was filed, and the Banks never sold their interest in their
property to anyone but themselves. Therefore, there is no bona fide purchaser problem,
and no issue of notice when they became the owner of the property. Further, the statute
is silent about whether a nonowner ever has the right to challenge a procedurally or
i

substantively defective lien.
For the foregoing reasons, VCS urges the Court to reverse the Trial Court's
finding that VCS lien is invalid, and Order that it has a valid lien in the amount of
$88,949.00 over lots 5-8, 10-22 and 31 and 32 of the Meadow's Park Subdivision. VCS
requests an order of judicial foreclosure of said lots to pay Plaintiff VCS for the amount
of this lien, its lien filing costs, court costs, and attorney's fees to-date in order to enforce
this lien.
B.

Plaintiff VCS Is Entitled To A Declaratory Judgment That It Has Priority
Over All Other Lien Claimants.
Plaintiff seeks a court order that it has priority over other encumbrances. U.C.A. §

38-1-5 establishes priority of encumbrances and states:
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The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take
effect as of, the time of the commencement to do work or
furnish materials on the ground for the structure or
improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage
or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently
to the time when the building, improvement or structure was
commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the
ground: also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of
which the lien holder had no notice and which was
unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement
was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on
the ground.
U.C.A. § 38-1-5 (2009). The date a contractor first begins its work on or supplies
materials to a project determines when the mechanic's lien arose. A lien for work on the
overall site (i.e. entire project), as well as work on individual building units located on the
site, all relate back to the date the initial work was done on the project. First of Denver
Mtg. Investors, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah, 1979) (mechanics' liens arising from the furnishing
of materials and labor-both on the 44-acre site as well as on individual condominium
units in the development-related back to the initial work done on the project). Record
notice does not establish priority. It is actual notice of the initiation of work or, at
minimum, visible commencement of work that establishes priority. EDSA/CLOWARD
L.L.C. v. Klibanofil 2005 UT App. 367, 122 P.3d 646.
In this case Plaintiff began physical on-site infrastructure work on the project by
the first week of November 2006, including, but not limited to, construction and
installation of storm drain, underground detention basin, concrete sidewalk, French drain,
silt fence, etc. and all the improvements necessary to complete the infrastructure of the
subdivision.
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Utah Community Bank did not make a loan to La Salle for the project until 9
January 2007, which was recorded on January 12, 2007. America West Bank's interest,
as recorded by trust deed, occurred on 24 October 2007. Because the banks obtained
their interest in the property after Plaintiff commenced work, Plaintiffs interest relates
back to at least November 2006, well in advance of the bank party-Defendants' trust
deeds and interest.
VCS seeks an order from the Court declaring that VCS's lien is valid and was
prior to Utah Community Bank's and America West Bank's interests in the property, and
that the Bank's interest, as well as that of their successor or assigns, is subordinate to the
mechanic's lien of VCS pursuant to Section 38-1-5.

II.

The Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Find That VCS Had Substantially
Complied With The Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute.
In the alternative, VCS's substantial compliance with Utah's Mechanic's Lien law

fulfilled the statutory intent of Utah Code Ann. §§38-1-7 and 38-1-11, and it is therefore
entitled to foreclose on the property. With the exception of Section 38-1-11(3), that Trial
Court found that VCS had "strictly" complied with all other requirements of the lien
statute. (R. at 646.)
The Utah Mechanics' Lien statute is found in Chapter 1 of Title 38. Specifically,
the 2006 amendment by ch. 297, effective May 1, 2006, substituted "this chapter" for
"this Subsection (2)" in Subsection (2)(b) of Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-7. 2006
Utah Laws 297. The specific language change, as reflected in the new session law, is
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"Substantial compliance with the requirements of this [D> Subsection (2) <D] [A>
CHAPTER <A] is sufficient to hold and claim a lien." 2006 Utah Laws 297, 2006 Ut
ALS 297, 2 (emphasis added).
This important language change shows the Utah Legislature's intent to allow lien
claimants to substantially comply with any section or subsection within the entire
mechanics' lien Chapter. Because the legislature intended this principle of substantial
compliance to apply to all of Chapter 1, substantial compliance with § 38-1-11 is
expressly allowed by statute and is sufficient if a Utah court finds the lien claimant
'substantially' met the requirements of that section.
As noted supra, for VCS to establish that it has a valid lien it must show:
(1)

it filed a lien within 180 days of the "last date on which substantial work
was performed under the original contract". U.C.A. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i)(A)
and (ii)(D) (2009).

(2)

it filed an action to enforce the lien within 180 days from the day it filed a
notice of claim under Section 38-1-7. U.C.A. § 38-1-11(2).

(3)

it did one of the following: a) filed a notice of the action with the county
recorder within 180 days, b) included the owner of the property as a party
to the action, or c) provided actual knowledge of the commencement of the
action to the owner of the property. Id. at (3)(a).

(4)

that it delivered or mailed by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to
the reputed or record owner of the real property. Id. (3)(a) and (c).
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VCS complied with these requirements, along with myriad other requirements
incorporated into the first two requirements (dates, times, places, signatures, lien
amounts, work completed, etc.). In addition, VCS did provide actual notice to the Banks
on October 16, 2008, approximately 8 and a Vi months after filing its lien, it filed a lis
pendens, it added the Banks as defendants to the case, etc. If the Court finds VCS did not
comply with Section 3 8-1 -11 (3), that failure is a mere technicality.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this point many years before the legislature
did in Boise Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983). The Court stated, "[t]he doctrine
of substantial compliance has validity and it has application in an appropriate case ." Id.
at 722. The Court went on to suggest that the Court is "fee to discount"
hypertechnicalities. Id.
As has already been noted, Utah courts have indicated that Utah's Mechanic's
Lien Law was implemented for the benefit of those persons that enhance the value of a
property by supplying labor or materials. AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. and Energy
Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986). Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 directs a lien claimant to
file an action to enforce the lien within 180 days from the filing of the lien. During the
statutory period designated for enforcement, Plaintiff not only filed an action to enforce
its lien, but also received a default judgment recognizing the validity of Plaintiff s lien.
In an effort to protect third party bona fide purchasers who acquire an interest in
the property without knowledge of an existing encumbrance, § 38-1-11 also includes a
requirement to file a lis pendens. Well in advance of Defendant UCB's acquisition of an
interest in the property, Plaintiff gave Defendant UCB actual notice of the pendency of its
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lien foreclosure action, and named Defendant UCB as a party to the action. Despite the
absence of a lis pendens filing, Defendant UCB had been given actual notice of
Plaintiffs pending action, thus fulfilling the purpose of § 38-1-1 l's lis pendens
requirement. Plaintiffs substantial compliance with the statute ensured that the policy
considerations underlying the lis pendens requirement had all been addressed, and that
Defendant UCB could not be unfairly prejudiced by the absence of the lis pendens filing.
Furthermore, at the conclusion of 180 day statutory period for enforcement,
Plaintiff was in possession of a default judgment entitling Plaintiff to foreclose on the
property in satisfaction of its lien. Plaintiff therefore had no reason to believe a lis
pendens was necessary. At that time, upon information and belief, there was equity in
the property and even if VCS's lien did not have first priority, it could foreclose on the
property subject to any higher-priority interests. When this Court later set aside that
default judgment, Plaintiff promptly gave Defendant UCB actual notice of its pending
lien action, and subsequently named Defendant UCB as a party to the action and filed a
lis pendens, all well in advance of UCB5 s later acquisition of an interest in the property.
Thus, Defendant UCB should not be allowed to distort Utah's Mechanic's Lien law to its
own advantage at the expense of those, like Plaintiff, for whom the law's protections
were intended.
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III.

The Trial Court Erred When It Found That VCS's Amended Complaint
Adding The Banks Did Not Relate Back To The Date Of The Original
Pleading Under Rule 15.
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. Proc. 15(c), Plaintiffs Amended Complaint adding

Defendant UCB to the action relates back to date of the original pleading, since
Defendant UCB, as an equitable owner of the property, had an identity of interest with
Defendant La Salle. Although Rule 15 generally does not permit relation back to an
amendment adding a party, an exception exists when the added party has an identity of
interest with the original named party. Doxev-Lavton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906
(Utah 1976). A party added during an amendment has an identity of interest when it has
been "sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from
an early stage." Id. Involvement at an early stage includes the period of time before a
scheduling order has been entered, before a trial date is set, and before discovery has
taken place or is ongoing. See Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, 10 (2002)
(allowing a plaintiffs amended complaint adding a defendant to relate back under Rule
15). Relation back as to a party with this identity of interest is proper since the party's
involvement negates any prejudice against it. At the time that Plaintiff amended its
Complaint to add Defendant UCB, no scheduling order had been entered, no trial date
had been set, and discovery had not yet started. The case was clearly at an early stage.
The rationale behind the identity of interest exception is to prevent a mechanical
use of a statute of limitations to prevent adjudication of a claim. Doxev-Lavton, 548 P.2d
at 906. Defendant UCB, fully aware of Plaintiff s superior lien at the time it foreclosed
on the property, did so in a mechanical effort to use a perceived statute of limitations to
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prevent Plaintiffs adjudication of its claim. It was already a party to the suit at the time
of foreclosure and took the property from La Salle, who was properly part of the lien suit.
Thus, Defendant UCB has an identity of interest with Defendant La Salle, and relation
back of Plaintiff s Amended Complaint adding Defendant UCB is proper.

IV.

The Trial Court Erred When It Denied VCS's Unjust Enrichment Claim
Against The Banks Where VCS Brought A Valid Lien Claim Against La Salle
And Where There Is A Genuine Issues Of Material Fact Concerning Whether
The Banks Were Unjustly Enriched By VCS's Work On The Property.
In approximately April 2007, Plaintiffs sole owner, Tom Phelps, met with

Defendant Utah Community Bank. At that time, VCS and Utah Community Bank
entered into a contract in which VCS would complete the construction of the homes if La
Salle were somehow to fail in meeting their obligations to the Bank. Id. While VCS
never had to fulfill this requirement because it was terminated by La Salle, Utah
Community Bank's decision to make this agreement shows that Defendant Utah
Community Bank: (1) was aware that VCS was working on the project; (2) was aware the
VCS was conferring a substantial benefit to La Salle and to the bank, who had a security
interest in the property receiving improvements; (3) had insecurity about La Salle's
ability to make payments and suspected it would have to foreclose on the property1; (4)
knew it would have to pay VCS for that benefit; and (5) knew that VCS expected
payment. In addition, Exhibit R shows Utah Community Bank's home construction loan

*As they ultimately did on 30 December 2009.
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line items for lots 19-22, that VCS was submitting invoices and/or draws as the work was
completed on the project, and that the Bank knew of VCS involvement on the project.
Because of these facts, a quasi contract existed between Utah Community Bank
and VCS. It would be inequitable for Utah Community Bank to retain the benefits of
VCS5 work without payment of its value. Therefore, Plaintiff urges that the Court find
that Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of $88,949.00, which is the total work
that Utah Community Bank benefitted from, plus interest, costs and attorney's fees, on
the grounds of quantum meruit and/or unjust enrichment.
Plaintiff has not failed to exhaust its legal remedies in pursuing recovery, and
therefore is entitled to summary judgment for unjust enrichment. Defendant UCB cites
Knight v. Post for the proposition that failing to exhaust ones legal remedies bars a claim
for unjust enrichment. 748 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Knight the plaintiff
failed to perfect its mechanic's lien, failed to bring an action to enforce the lien, and
failed to pursue a claim in bankruptcy to recover. Id. at 1100. Because the Plaintiff was
dilatory, and failed to seek recovery before these remedies had expired, the court refused
to allow the plaintiff to bring a tardy claim for unjust enrichment. Id Unlike the facts in
Knight in the present case, Plaintiff has not exhausted its legal remedies, but is actively
seeking to enforce them. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of lien, and properly brought an
action to enforce the lien. Under any scenario, the Court erroneously found that VCS's
lien was void. (R. at 646-50.) And, as shown above, UCB knowledge of the lien and
foreclosure action and its being named as a party prior to its ownership of the property
comply with both the technical terms of the lien statute and its intent. The pendency of
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this action is proof that Plaintiffs legal remedies are not exhausted, and a claim for unjust
enrichment is not barred. Therefore, Defendant UCB was not entitled to summary
judgment dismissing Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim.
In addition, it is uncontroverted that Defendant UCB entered into an
agreement in 2007 with VCS for VCS to act as the general contractor to complete
the construction in the event that La Salle was unable to complete the project and/or
failed to meet its financial obligations. (R. at 321.) Utah Community Bank failed to
refute that there was a written contract in its response to VCS's Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R. at 512-535.) (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiffs Statement of Fact No. 15 and Phelps Second Affidavit No. 19-20).
Therefore, this statement is deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
In addition, there are questions of fact concerning whether Utah Community Bank
was unjustly enriched because of the following facts. UCB: (1) was aware that VCS was
working on the project; (2) was aware the VCS was conferring a substantial benefit to La
Salle and to the bank, who had a security interest in the property receiving improvements;
(3) had insecurity about La Salle's ability to make payments and suspected it would have
to foreclose on the property; (4) knew it would have to pay VCS for its work on the
project; (5) knew that VCS expected payment; (6) knew that its loan proceeds were used
to pay for ongoing improvements; (7) kept a Tracking Log of the loan line items and
expenses/invoices/costs for the project; and (8) knew that VCS was intimately involved
in the project and was submitting invoices and/or draws for work done by it or its
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subcontractors as the work was completed on the project. (R. at 319-21, 338, 341, 47278, 649.) For these reasons alone the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment for
theUCB.
In 2007 UCB had knowledge of VCS's work on the project and intended for VCS
to work on the project even if the then current owner, La Salle, were not able to continue
to employ VCS. La Salle removed VCS as the general contractor long before La Salle
lost the property, so UCB never required that VCS complete the project according to their
agreement. Still, this shows that UCB unequivocally knew that VCS was working on
property in which it had an equitable and, later, a legal interest, and intended to benefit
from VCS's work if La Salle's interest in the property were foreclosed on—which is
exactly what happened.
In addition, UCB made payments for VCS's work directly to subcontractors, for
permitting, etc. and was intimately familiar with the work by VCS and its subcontractors
on the project. There is no factual dispute that VCS conferred a benefit on UCB, that
UCB retained that benefit, and that, under these circumstances, it would be unjust for
UCB to retain the benefit of that work without paying for that benefit. Now, when the
Bank sells the lot, it can get more money for it because of VCS's efforts.

V.

The Trial Court Erred When It Set Aside VCS Default Judgment Against La
Salle For Failure Of Service Where The Assistant For The Registered Agent
Expressly Stated She Had Permission To Except Service For the Registered
Agent.
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The Trial Court found that leaving a copy of a summons and complaint with the
secretary of the registered agent constituted improper service. (R. at 210-11.) As a
result, the Trial Court set aside VCS's initial default judgment in 2008. While VCS
eventually obtained a judgment against La Salle for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment, VCS prefers to have the initial judgment stand because it allows VCS to
have its judgment first in time over subsequent liens or interest holders.
In order to be relieved of a judgment under rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a defendant must show: 1) that the judgment was entered against her because
of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 2) that she has a meritorious
defense; and 3) that the motion was timely made. See Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l
Forwarders. Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994). Each of these requirements is
analyzed below. Default judgments are set aside under Rule 55 using the same criteria in
Utah. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson. 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982).
A. The Defendant's Inexcusable Neglect Is Shown By Its Failure To Act On Its
Receipt of the Summons and Complaint
Under Rule 4 of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure service of process is effective
by delivering the summons and complaint to an "officer, a managing or general agent, or
other agent authorized by appointment or by law". Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 4(d)(1)(E)
(2008). Utah courts have interpreted the prior version of this Rule as prohibiting service
upon a person who is a mere employee. Beard v. White, Green & Addision Assocs., 336
P.2d 125,126 (Utah 1959) (person accepting service must be "must be in charge of some
of its property, operations, business activities, office, place of business or in some manner
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be responsible for or have control over its affairs.")- Not only was this ruling based in
part on the prior version of the Rule, but the facts of that case are distinguishable.
In Beard, the officer who effected service claimed he served Bottomley, and
alleged that Bottomley claimed he was a foreman. This was controverted by the
testimony of "Bottomley, Miller and White that Bottomley was not a foreman, and that
Miller was the foreman, and the uncontradicted testimony that Miller had been so held
out and introduced to the sheriff and his deputy who made the service as such...." Id. As
a result, the Court found that the trial court's decision that there was service was
unreasonable and contrary to the evidence. Id.
In contrast to Beard, in this case the process server, Rose Green, had a business
practice of first inquiring if the person is the registered agent and second, if they were
not, requesting to know if the person could accept process for the Registered Agent.
Green Aff.f2-3. Here, Ms. Cailey Tonks expressly stated she would accept service and
even wrote the words, "FOR REGISTERED AGENT TED MADSEN" on the from sheet
of the Summons below her signature. Id.
Defendant attempts to support the idea that a Summons and Complaint cannot be
left with just anyone at the business site misses the mark. Defendant first cites to Garcia
v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986). This is a case concerning the Court's striking down
of service on a prisoner officer for an inmate. This is distinguishable on the grounds that
first, such service is controlled by statute, and secondly it is not a case concerning a
registered agent for a corporation in the state controlled by Rule 4(d)(1)(E). Nor is it a
case where an agent for the registered agent accepts service.
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Equally unavailing is Defendant's reliance on In re Schwenke. 2004 UT 2004 UT
17, 89 P.3d 117. That case concerned a disbarred attorney's service of petition for
reinstatement on common-area receptionist at the Utah Law and Justice Center. The
Court found that the service did not constitute effective service of process on the Office
of Professional Conduct (OPC), and was thus not sufficient to begin 60-day time limit for
OPC to file its objection. In that case the receptionist was not supervised or employed by
OPC, was not authorized to accept service on behalf of OPC, did not deliver documents
to OPC, was not told that petition was intended for OPC, and the process server received
no assurances that the petition would be delivered to OPC. Id. at f24-2 5. The same
Court also stated" Courts have often found service to be effective where the employee
who received service had a significant amount of authority or apparent authority within
the organization; where the employee played an integrated role within the organization
such that he or she would know what to do with papers; or where there were other
assurances that the documents would reach the intended recipient." Id.
Courts outside of Utah have also found that receptionists can have implied
authority to accept service of process where that receptionist stated they could accept the
summons. Kuhlik v. Atlantic Corp., 112F.R.D. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Direct Mail
Specialists. Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs.. Inc.. 840 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir.1988)
(finding service on receptionist effective where corporation was comparatively small and
the role played by receptionist was proportionally large, and receptionist was the only one
in the office when the process server arrived, indicating that she possessed more than
minimal responsibility); Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maat-Schappii N.V. v. Curtiss-Wright
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Corp., 17 F.R.D. 49, 51 (S.D.N.Y.1955) (holding face-to-face encounter with corporate
officer not required to effect service where the officer's receptionist accepted service,
promised to deliver the papers to the proper person, and did in fact deliver the papers).
See also Classic Cabinets v. All American Life Ins. Co., 1999 UT App. 88
This Court should find that Ms. Tonks' statement that she could accept service,
and writing to that effect, show her implied authority to act as an agent for the registered
agent, Ted Madsen. All the current rule requires is that the person be "authorized" or a
"general agent". Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 4(d)(1)(E) (2008). In this case, the Court should
find that Ms. Tonks satisfies the Rule.
It is unknown whether Ms. Tonks immediately gave the Summons and Complaint
to Registered Agent Ted Madsen. What is known is that in a meeting held after the
complaint was served and before the default judgment was entered between Kyle Lind,
Rick Sorensen, Tom Stevenson and Tom Phelps, Kyle Lind knew about the
La Salle complaint prior to the default judgment. Phelps Aff, Tf8. This is fairly easily
proven by an affidavit from Ms. Tonks, but Defendants chose not to provide this. Instead,
Defendant's support the proposition that Madsen never received the Summons and
Complaint or Notice of Judgment Lien by Madsen's affidavit which states, "I do not
recall ever receiving the Notice..." Madsen Declaration, ^5-6. ]
1

Defendant argues that it changed its Registered Agent on September 11, 2008, and
therefore did not receive a copy of the Judgment on September 24, 2008. However,
Rule 55 only requires an entity seeking default to prove that the "defendant has been
personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
55(b)(1)(C). The party in default need not be given notice of the entry of default.
Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen. 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982). Defendant's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43

Registered agents have a duty to "forward to the represented entity... any
process, notice, or demand that is served on the agent." U.C.A. §16-17-302(1) (2008).
The fact that 1) the receptionist had implied authority to accept service, 2) she accepted
service, and 3) Kyle Lind acknowledged receipt of the Complaint prior to the judgment
being entered, shows that Ted Madsen received the complaint and summons. The fact
that he did "not recall ever receiving" it, in this case, is not credible. Once received, he
had a duty to forward it to the La Salle, which must have occurred.
Further evidence of Defendant's inexcusable neglect is the fact that Defendant did
nothing after counsel for Plaintiff repeatedly inquired whether Rick Sorensen, who
represented Kyle Lind on other suits with VCS, Inc., inquired whether Sorensen
represented La Salle Development, LLC. The Defendant concedes the following
pertinent facts:
"6. Sometime after March 26, 2008, VCS's attorney Tom
Stevenson (hereinafter "Attorney Stevenson"), contacted me
and asked if I represent La Salle. I responded that L. Kyle
Lind had not asked me to represent La Salle. Attorney
Stevenson did not inform me that VCS had filed suit against
La Salle or that VCS was seeking a default judgment against
La Salle.
7. After the conversation with Attorney Stevenson, I
contacted L. Kyle Lind and informed L. Kyle Lind of the
conversation I had with VCS's attorney about La Salle. L.
Kyle Lind stated that he did not know why VCS's attorney

argument on this point is unavailing. In addition, the termination of the registered
agentfftakes effect on the 31st day after the day on which it is filed." U.C.A. §16-17205(2) (2008). Therefore, on September 24, 2008, the change of Agent had not taken
effect.
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was asking about representation because as far as he knew,
VCS had not sued La Salle."
. . . • • •

•

Sorensen Declaration, ffif6-7. The facts above indicate that in the meeting between the
parties Lind acknowledged receipt of the Complaint, and even commented that he hoped
his partner Don Hampton, did not answer it as he had in a prior case. But even if that
were not true, after such an inquiry by attorney Stevenson about Sorensen's
representation of La Salle Development, LLC, it may be argued that a reasonable person
would: 1) check with his registered agent to see if a suit was delivered, 2) do a simple
case search to see if a complaint had been filed, or 3) inquire of attorney Stevenson if a
suit was filed.
The Utah Supreme Court defines excusable neglect as "the exercise of 'due
diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc.
V. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987); Brunetti v. Mascaro, 854
P.2d 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (permitting withdraws where there is a reasonable excuse
for Defendant's failure to respond). Even if the evidence was not overwhelming that the
Defendant was served, the Court should find even on the basis of the Defendant's
statement of facts alone that Kyle Lind did not act as a reasonably prudent person and
uphold the default judgment.
R^

Defendant Did Not File the Motion to Set Aside Timely
Defendant would show the Court that pursuant to the Court's docket, judgment

was filed on 1 May 2008 and entered on 6 June 2008. Exhibit D. Defendants brought
this motion on 23 January 2009. Pursuant to Rule 60, this motion was made more than
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three (3) months after that judgment. Utah R. Civ. P , Rule 60 (2008). The Court should
strike the Motion as untimely.
The trial court found that a receptionist must represent themselves as holding "a
position of authority to accept service". R. at 710, p. 7-8, 10. The Court also reasoned
that Utah courts clearly "disfavor . . . default judgments". Id. at 11. This ruling leads to
an absurd result which other states have wrestled with and declined to conclude.
Essentially, any time a registered agent in this state is both an individual and that
individual has his own business that is separate from the entity for which his is the
registered agent, if an assistant working for that registered agent's business accepts
service, no matter explicitly, the Defendant can defeat service merely by claiming his
assistant never gave it to him.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, VCS respectfully requests that the Supreme Court:
1. Reverse the Trial Court below;
2. Find that La Salle was served the complaint on March 19, 2008;
3. Find that VCS met its burden for summary judgment and has a valid and
enforceable lien;
4. Find that FDIC and Utah Community Bank failed to meet their burden for
purposes of their cross motions for summary judgment;
5. Order the judicial foreclosure of the nineteen lots liened by VCS within Northpark
Meadows subdivision;
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6. Order that VCS's lien and lis pendens be reinstated on all nineteen lots within the
subdivision;
7. Order that VCS's lien has superior priority to the Trust Deeds held by Utah
Community Bank and FDIC;
8. Reverse the award of attorney's fees to the Banks; and
9. Award VCS its attorney's fees, costs and interest pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §§ 38-1-18 and 15-1-1 (as previously requested, R. at 231-63, 312, 645)
and remand to the Trial Court to determine the appropriate amount of fees.
10. In the alternative, find that the Utah Community Bank and FDIC have been
unjustly enriched and award VCS its attorney's fees, costs and interest pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78B-5-825 and 15-1-1 (as previously requested, R. at
231-63, 312, 645) and remand to the Trial Court to determine the appropriate
amount of fees.
11. Any other appropriate relief as determined by the Court.

Respectfully Submitted,
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

QUA

David B. Stevenson, No. 12244
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
VCS, Inc.
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36 South State Street, Suite 1400
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Attorney for FDIC as Receiver for America West Bank
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ADDENDA
The following are exhibits provided for the ease of the court in referencing key
documents related to this appeal:
1. Selected Statute and Regulations
2. Ruling Granting Motion to Set Aside Judgment, 27 April 2009 (R. at 209-214)
3. Ruling on Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Defendants' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, 26 October, 2010
4. Return of Service 20 Day Summons
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SELECTED STATUTE AND REGULATIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 - "The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take
effect as of, the time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground
for the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other
encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when the building,
improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the
ground: also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of which the lien holder had
no notice and which was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement
was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground."
U.C.A. § 38-1-5 (2009).
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-9 - "(1) The recorder must record the claim in an index
maintained for that purpose. (2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all persons
are considered to have notice of the claim." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-9 (2011).
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(2)(b) - "Substantial compliance with the requirements of this
chapter is sufficient to hold and claim a lien." Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(2)(b) (2007).
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(l)(a) "(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Owner" is as defined in Section 38-11-102.
(b) "Residence" is as defined in Section 38-11-102.
(2) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter: (a)
except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), within 180 days after the day on which the lien
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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claimant filed a notice of claim under Section 38-1-7; or (b) if an owner files for
protection under the bankruptcy laws of the United States before the expiration of the
180-day period under Subsection (2)(a), within 90 days after the automatic stay under the
bankruptcy proceeding is lifted or expires.
(3) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (2) the lien claimant shall
file for record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a
notice of the pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title
or right to possession of real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who
have been made parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of the
commencement of the action, (b) The burden of proof is upon the lien claimant and those
claiming under the lien claimant to show actual knowledge under Subsection (3)(a).
(4) (a) A lien filed under this chapter is automatically and immediately void if an action
to enforce the lien is not filed within the time required by this section, (b)
Notwithstanding Section 78B-2-111, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate a lien that becomes void under Subsection (4)(a)." Utah Code Ann. §38-111(1-4) (2011).
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102 - ""Owner" means a person who: (a) contracts with a
person who is licensed as a contractor or is exempt from licensure under Title 58, Chapter
55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, for the construction on an owner-occupied
residence upon real property owned by that person; (b) contracts with a real estate
developer to buy a residence upon completion of the construction on the owner-occupied
residence; or (c) buys a residence from a real estate developer after completion of the
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construction on the owner-occupied residence." Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102(17) (2011).
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Utah Rule 4(d)(1)(E) - "Upon any corporation not herein
otherwise provided for, upon a partnership or upon an unincorporated association which
is subject to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and the
complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by
statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy of the
summons and the complaint to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found
within the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an
office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does business within this state
or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of such office or place of business." Utah R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(E) (2011)." Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(E) (2011).
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN D E P A R T M E N T

VCS. INC.. a Utah Corporation.
Plaintiff,

RULING GRANTING
MOTION TO SET ASIDEJUDGMENT

vs.
LA SALLE DEVELOPMENT, INC..

Case No. 080901677
Judge Michael D. DiReda

Defendant.

On January 26, 2009, Defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment entered
against it, pursuant to rule 60(b). Plaintiff submitted a memorandum in opposition, and
Defendant filed a reply. The Court heard oral arguments on April 16, 2009. after which the
Court took the motion under advisement. The Court now grants the motion.
Defendant La Salle Development, Inc., is a limited liability corporation, whose registered
agent at the time this action was filed was Ted Madsen, an accountant with no other affiliation
with Defendant. Rule 4(d)(l )(E) provides that a corporation shall be personally served "by
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent,
or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process... T Utah R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(E).
On March 19. 2008. Plaintiff served Defendant by leaving a copy of the summons and
complaint with Cailey Tonks, a receptionist of Madsen & Associates, CPAs, who signed the
receipt of service "For Registered Agent Ted Madsen. " Ms. Tonks is in no way affiliated with
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Defendant La Salle Development. Ted Madsen does not remember ever receiving the summons
and complaint and did not provide them to Defendant.
On June 6r 2008, the Court entered default judgment against Defendant. In ear]}'
September, La Salle Development changed its registered agent from Ted Madsen to L. Kyle
Lindvwho is affiliated with Defendant, In late September, Plaintiff mailed a notice of judgment
lien to Madsen; however, Madsen does not recall receiving such notice. Defendant did not
become aware of the default judgment until December 18, 2008, when Plaintiff served an
application for writ of execution on L. Kyle Lind. Defendant filed its motion to set aside the
judgment on January 26, 2009.
Rule 60(b)(4) allows the Court to relieve a party from a final judgment if "the judgment is
void." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Proper sendee under rule 4 is required for a court to acquire
jurisdiction over a defendant. Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 100 P.3d 1211, 1214 (Utah 2004).
In a case where a court fails to acquire jurisdiction due to improper service, any judgment
rendered would be void. See id.
The Court finds that leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with Ms. Tonics was
an improper means of serving Defendant La Salle Development under rule 4. In this case, the
Defendant corporation had designated Ted Madsen as its registered agent for receiving service of
process. But Mr. Madsen was not the only option for effectuating service on Defendant. In fact,
rule 4(d)(1)(E) designates multiple options for serving process on a corporation, namely by
serving "an officer, a managing or genera] agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by
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law." Ms. Tonks, as a receptionisi for the registered agent of the Defendant, does not fall within
any of those designations.
While there is no controlling case law on this narrow issue of service on the receptionist
of a registered agent one case was particularly helpful in guiding the Court's ruling. In the case
of In re Schwenke, 89 P.3d 117 (Utah 2004). the Utah Supreme Court, addressed the similar
situation where a receptionist for the defendant corporation is served, holding thai u[g]enerally,
'proper service is not effected by serving the corporation's receptionist.'" Id at 123. The court
did note exceptions to this general rule, in which a receptionist may accept service on behalf of a
corporation.
It is important to note, however, that the facts in the present case are distinguishable from
the scenarios contemplated in Schwenke. Here, Ms. Tonics is not a receptionist of Defendant La
Salle Development, and is in no way affiliated with that corporation. Further, Mr. Madsen, who
is also not affiliated with Defendant other than in his role as registered agent, is not the object of
the service; rather, he is merely a designated proxy by which Defendant La Salle Development
may be served. As receptionist of the registered agent's accounting firm, Ms. Tonks is one step
further removed from the general rule in Schwenke. that "proper service is not effected by-serving
the corporation's receptionist.'* As serving a corporation's receptionist is generally not effective
in servine a corporation, certainly serving a receptionist of a registered agent of a corporation is
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Evidence was presented by the Plaintiff that, despite the form of service, Defendant La
Salle Development may have received notice of the lawsuit. However, the evidence presented by
both sides leaves that factual issue, at best unceitain. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it
is its "declared policy that in case of uncertainty, default judgments should be set aside to allow
trial on the merits." Locke v. Peterson. 285 P.2d 111L 1113 (Utah 1955). Moreover, this Court
is mindful that "[jjudgments by default are not favored by the courts," and that "courts, in the
interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a full and complete opportunity for a
hearing on the merits of every case." Heathmaii v. Fabian & Clendemn, 377 P.2d 189. 190 (Utah
1962).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "a movant is entitled to have a default judgment
set aside under rule 60(b) if (1) the motion is timely; (2) there is a basis for granting relief under
one of the subsections of 60(b); and (3) the movant has alleged a meritorious defense,"' Menzies
v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480, 504 (Utah 2006). As the motion in this case was made under rule
60(b)(4), the motion need only be "made within a reasonable time." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The
motion was made on January 26, 2009, which the court finds reasonable, given it was
approximately one month after Defendant became aware of the judgment.
The Court also finds there is a basis for granting relief under rule 60(b). Based on the
lack of proper service, the Court never obtained jurisdiction over the Defendant. As such, the
default judgment entered by the Court is void, which is provided as a basis for relief under
subsection (4) of rule 60(b).
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Finally, the Court finds thai the Defendant has sufficiently alleged a meritorious defense.
tc

This requirement does noi sei an overly burdensome threshold: ... [Wlhere a parry presents a

clear and specific, proffer of a defense that, if proven, would [warrant reiiefj by the ciaimani ... it
has adequately shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense.""' Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d
480, 517 (Utah 2006). In its memorandum in support of the motion. Defendant disputed that it
owes the amounts alleged by Plaintiff in its complaint. This is sufficient to meet the low
threshold of presenting a meritorious defense.
Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment. The
Court's Judgment of June 6, 2008, is hereby set aside.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ^
day of April. 2009.1 sent: a true and correct copy of the
foreeoing ruliim to Plaintiff and Defendant as follows:

David B. Stephenson. Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogdeii, Utah 84403

Rick L. Sorensen, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
5710 South Green Street
Murray, Utah 84123

\

Deputy Court Clerk
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

VCS, INC., a Utah company,

vs.

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S M O T I O f { 0 o P r>
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
*c ° L
DEFENDANTS' CRQSSJVIOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDfcJME

LA SALLE DEVELOPMENT, LLC;
AMERICA WEST BANK; UTAH
COMMUNITY BANK; and DOES 1-10

Case No. 080901677
Judge Michael D. DiRedk

Plaintiff,

FILED
OCT 2

2010

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

Defendant(s).

On March 31, 2010, Plaintiff VCS, Inc. ("VCS") filed a motion for summary judgment to
enforce its mechanic's lien against Defendants La Salle Development, LLC ("La Salle"), Utah
CommiHihy Bank ("UCB"), and America West Bank ("FDIC") and to sue for unjust enrichment.
Both UCB and FDIC filed oppositions to the motion along with cross-motions for summary
judgment arguing that the lien is void and the unjust enrichment claim is not valid as to each bank,
respectively. The Court heard oral arguments on September 20,2010. After considering the motions
and the oral arguments, the Court grants both UCB's and FDIC's cross-motions for summary
judgment. The Court notes that La Salle has not yet responded to Plaintiffs original motion for
summary judgment.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that summary judgment is appropriate when there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court may consider in its determination "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any.*' Id
The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
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The material facts in this case are not in dispute. In March 2006. Plaintiff VCS entered into a
contract with La Salle to develop lots located in North Park Meadows. Actual construction work
commenced in November of that year. On January 12, 2007, UCB recorded a trust deed on the
property, which it secured by a loan to La Salle. La Salle then orally terminated VCS in September
2007, and VCS ceased all work on the lots. On October 24,2007, FDIC then recorded atrust deed on
lots 31 and 32, which it too secured by a loan to La Salle. VCS filed a mechanic's lien on lots 3-22
and 31-32 on January 29, 2008; however, VCS did not record a lis pendens at this time. On March
12,2008, VCS filed suit against La Salle but did not name UCB or FDIC as parties. La Salle failed
to represent itself, and the Court ordered a default judgment for VCS on June 6, 2008. VCS
informed UCB or FDIC of this action on October 16, 2008, when VCS sent letters informing both
banks of the judgment against La Salle. Because of issues regarding whether La Salle was properly
served in the action, the Court then set aside the default judgment in April 2009. Shortly thereafter,
VCS amended its complaint, added UCB and FDIC as parties to the action, and filed a lis pendens.
On December 30, 2009, UCB then became owner of lots 5-8 and 10-22 pursuant to a foreclosure
sale.
Plaintiff VCS has brought this action to enforce its mechanic's lien against La Salle, UCB,
and FDIC and also to recover from each party in quantum meruit for unjust enrichment. Each bank
argues that the lien is void and that there is no valid unjust enrichment claim. Alternatively, UCB
and FDIC argue that the Plaintiff has failed to establish the value of its alleged mechanic's lien.
Depending upon the Court's analysis of the law, Plaintiff VCS has requested more time under rule
5 6(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for further discover)7. Finally, VCS, UCB, and FDIC all
request attorneys' fees pursuant to § 38-1-18.
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The Court agrees with both UCB and FDIC and finds that the lien is void as to both parties
and that there is no valid unjust enrichment claim. B ecause the Court finds the lien is void, the Court
makes no findings regarding whether the value of the lien is proper. Furthermore, the Court denies
Plaintiffs request for more time under rule 56(f). Finally, the Court awards attorneys' fees to both
UCB and FDIC pursuant to § 38-1-18. The Court's reasoning is set out below.
I.

VALIDITY OF MECHANIC'S LIEN
A mechanic's lien will be enforced if the claimant of the lien complies with the requirements

as set forth in the Utah Code. Section 3 8-1 -7(a)(i), (ii) requires that the lien claimant file a notice of a
lien claim within 180 days "after the day on which occurs final completion of the original contract"
or "the last date on which substantial work was performed under the original contract." Plaintiff
strictly complied with this requirement, filing a notice of its lien in January' 2008, only four months
after substantial work was completed on the original contract with La Salle in September 2007.
After filing a notice of the lien, a lien claimant must then file an action to enforce the lien
within 180 daj's. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(2)(a). Again, Plaintiff strictly complied with this
requirement by filing an action in March 2008 and naming La Salle as a defendant. However,
Plaintiff failed to name UCB and FDIC as defendants. Within that same time period of 180 days, the
statute also requires that the "lien claimant shall file for record . . . a notice of the pendency of the
action . . . or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the action
and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action" § 38-1-1 l(3)(a)
(emphasis added). Plaintiff did not provide UCB or FDIC with actual notice of the action until at
least October 16, 2008—over eight months after the initial filing of the lien. Furthermore, Plaintiff
did not name UCB or FDIC as parties to the action until April 2009—over a year after the initial
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filing of the lien. Because Plaintiff failed to-iimely record a lis pendens within 180 days of the
commencement of the action, the question before the Court is whether the lien is void as to UCB and
FDIC because neither bank was added as a party to the foreclosure action nor was provided with
actual knowledge of the action within the 180 days allowed for filing a lis pendens.
Plaintiff VCS argues that the lien remains valid as to UCB and FDIC for three reasons:
1) the statute should be read to only require that UCB and FDIC be added to the foreclosure action or
have actual knowledge of the action before either bank purchases the property at the foreclosure
sale—not within 180 days of the filing of the action; 2) Plaintiff s amended complaint naming UCB
and FDIC as parties relates back to the date of the original pleading; and 3) Plaintiff substantially
complied with the statute.
1. THE MEANING OF U.CA. § 38-1-1 U3VaV
First, Plaintiff argues that, its lien is valid against UCB and FDIC because it strictly complied
with the requirements of the lien statute. When evaluating statutes, the Court looks at the plain
meaning and seeks to "avoid interpretations that will render portions of the statute superfluous our
inoperative." Hall v. State Dep f ofCorr., 2001 UT 34. Each party has interpreted §38-1-1 l(3)(a)
based upon the statute's plain meaning and reached different results: Plaintiff argues that the
exceptions to a void lien—namely, naming a party7 in a foreclosure action or proving actual
knowledge of the action—are not subject to the 180 day requirement while both UCB and FDIC
argue that the exceptions are subject to the time requirement. Because the Court finds that the
language of the statute by itself is unclear as to whether or not the 180 day requirement applies to the
exceptions, the Court must look at controlling precedent for an interpretation of the statute,
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In order to justify its interpretation of § 38-1-1 l(3)(a). Plaintiff relies on the facts and holding
of ButterfieldLumber, Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Corp., 815 P.2d 1330 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In
Butterfield, the contractor, Butterfield. filed a mechanic* s hen on a property after Peterson Mortgage
recorded a trust deed but before the time frame required by § 38-1-7 expired. The owner of the
property defaulted, and Butterfield then filed an action to enforce its lien, naming Peterson Mortgage
as a party to the action within the time frame required by § 38-1 -11. Butterfield did not record a lis
pendens, however. Peterson Mortgage then foreclosed on the property and sold the property to a third
party who had no knowledge of Butterfield's mechanic's lien. The question for the appellate court
was whether the mechanic's lien attached to the proceeds of the sale of the property between
Peterson Mortgage and the third party when the contractor failed to record a lis pendens. The Court
held that the lien did attach to the proceeds, relying on the exceptions to filing a lis pendens listed in
§ 38-1-11 of the Utah Code and explaining that "the section 38-1-11 protection of third party
purchasers without notice of a mechanics5 lien foreclosure does not extend to those who acquire
ownership with such notice [i.e., Peterson Mortgage]/5 Butterfield Lumber, 815 P.2d at 1334.
Plaintiff VCS relies on the above language in Butterfield to justify enforcing its lien against
UCB because UCB acquired ownership of the property over a year after it received knowledge of
Plaintiffs suit. In this Court's view, Butterfield is distinguishable from the present case in one
important respect: "[Bjecause Butterfield properly named and served Peterson Mortgage as a party to
the lien foreclosure, it met the statutory requirements for preserving its lien against Peterson
Mortgage's interest in the property in question." Butterfield Lumber, 815 P.2d at 1334. Butterfield
completed work on the original contract on April 10. 1987. and filed suit naming Peterson Mortgage
as a party on April 6? 1988.within the (then) twelve-month statutory timeframe outlined by § 38-1-11
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(1988). Thus, unlike Plaintiff in the instant case, Butterfield perfected its lien against Peterson
Mortgage within the proscribed statutory period. This critical fact makes Butterfield of little help in
advancing Plaintiff s argument.
When interpreting the statute, the Court is more persuaded by the facts and holding of
Interlake Distributors, Inc. v. Old Mill Towne, 954 P.2d 1295 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). hi Inter lake Ahz
appellants—several contractors—sought to enforce their mechanics' liens against the construction
lender, Deseret Pacific, and the current owner of the property, Old Mill. Because the appellants failed
to record a lis pendens within the timeframe required by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(1974) (amended
1994), the Court concluded that "under the plain language of the statute, appellants5 liens are void
against Deseret Pacific and Old Mill unless within tw>elve months from the time appellants completed
their work, Deseret Pacific and Old Mill were either made parties to or had actual knowledge of the
lawsuit." Interlake, 954 P.2d at 1297 (emphasis added). The Court also reasoned that "[t]he fact that
appellants knew of the lawsuits after the statutorily required period does not support the inference
that they knew of the lawsuit during the required period." Id, at 1298. Thus, this Court is persuaded
that the exceptions to filing a lis pendens, namely, naming a party in an action or showing actual
knowledge of the action, must occur within the statutory timeframe; i.e., withinl 80 days from the
filing of the lien.
Plaintiff has failed to show that UCB or FDIC had knowledge of its action against La Salle
during the time allowed to file a lis pendens. The earliest evidence of any actual knowledge to which
Plaintiff can point is letters the defendants received from Plaintiff on October 16, 2008—over two
months after the 180 day deadline. Plaintiff argues that UCB was involved enough in the original
contract between Plaintiff and La Salle that it should have known of the litigation: however, "the
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statute does not permit constructive notice or inquiry notice to qualify as a substitute for a lis
pendens, but only actual notice.'" Inierlake, 954 P.2d at 1298. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Plaintiff did not comply with the statute in terms of UCB and FDIC and the lien is void as to both
parties.
2. AMENDED COMPLAINT
Second, Plaintiff VCS argues that its amended complaint filed in April 2009 naming both
UCB and FDIC as parties relates back to the time of the original filing of the action in March 2008.
Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the
original pleading." When new defendants are added as parties in an amended complaint, they must
have an identity of interest with the original defendant. Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247. An
identity of interest exists when parties have been "sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were
involved in them unofficially, from an early stage." Doxey-Laton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906
(Utah 1976).
Plaintiff contends that because UCB and FDIC were added as parties before a trial date was
set or any discovery had commenced in the action that they had an identity of interest with La Salle.
The Court is unconvinced by this argument. First of all, as was already discussed, Plaintiff has
offered no evidence that either UCB or FDIC knew about the foreclosure action before the 180 day
time frame established by statute and, therefore, they could not have been "sufficiently alerted to the
proceedings.'' Id. Furthermore, the purpose behind the relation back doctrine is to "prevent a
mechanical use of a statute of limitations . . . to prevent adjudication of a claim." Id. The Utah
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Supreme Court in AAA Fencing Co. v. Rainiree Dev. & Energ)> Co. specifically analyzed the
mechanic's lien timeframe as a substantive restriction on an action and not as a statute of limitations.
714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986). Relying, on this reasoning, the Utah Court of Appeals in Diehl
Lumber Transportation Inc. v. Mickelson held: "Viewing the statutory time limit as strictly
jurisdictional, it follows that once the time had expired, the court lacked authority to revive the hen
by permitting amendment under Rule 15(c)." 802 P.2d 739, 744 (Utah Ct. App 1990). Accordingly,
the relation back doctrine cannot be used to revive a voided mechanic's lien. Furthermore, were the
Court to allow an amended complaint to relate back to the time of the original filing, the Court
would be rendering the requirement to file a lis pendens completely useless, as a claimant would
have no reason to file a lis pendens within the statutory timeframe knowing that the complaint can be
amended to add parties later without it.
3. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
Finally, Plaintiff VCS argues that despite the fact that it did not strictly comply with the
requirements of § 38-1-11(3 )(a), the lien should be enforced against LICB and FDIC because Plaintiff
substantially complied with the mechanic's lien statute by filing its lien and commencing its action to
enforce it against La Salle within the statutory timeframe. Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that although
it failed to file a lis pendens, it did add both UCB and FDIC as parties to the action before UCB
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, thus complying with the policy behind the lis pendens.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that it had no reason to file a lis pendens because it was already in possession
of a default judgment against La Salle before the statutory deadline.
In support of its argument, Plaintiff relies on the purpose of the mechanic's lien statute,
which is "to provide protection to those who enhance the value of a property by supplying labor or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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materials." AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. And Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986).
Because of this'overarching policy. Utah courts "have recognized that substantial compliance with
[the mechanic's lien] provisions is all that is required." Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State
Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990). While it is true that u[a] lien once acquired by labor
performed on a building .. . should n o t . . . be defeated by technicalities... when no rights of others
are infringed," the Utah Supreme Court has only allowed such a broad reading of the statute when
"no express command of the statute is disregarded." Id. at 744, Plaintiff did not comply with the
express commands of § 38-1 -11 (3)(a) to preserve the validity of its lien against UCB and FDIC. By
not filing a lis pendens and by not adding either defendant as a party to the original action within the
180-day timeframe, Plaintiff disregarded more than mere technicalities. Furthermore, Plaintiffs
contention that it had no reason to believe a lis pendens was necessary also fails. Both FDIC and
UCB recorded trust deeds on the property well before Plaintiff brought its action against La Salle.
Plaintiff should have been aware, then, that both parties had a competing interest in the property.
Therefore, Plaintiffs void mechanic's lien is not revived by mere substantial compliance with the
statute.
Accordingly, because there are no material issues of genuine fact regarding whether Plaintiff
perfected its lien against UCB and FDIC, the Court grants the defendants5 cross-motions for
summary judgment in regard to the invalidity of the lien.
4. UNJUST.ENRICHMENT
Plaintiff VCS also seeks summary judgment with respect to its claims against UCB
and FDIC for unjust enrichment. Generally, "one must first exhaust his legal remedies before he ma)?
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recover on the basis of the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit" Knighl v. Post,. 748 P.2d 1097
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Although Plaintiff may have successfully perfected its lien against La Salle,
Plaintiff failed to adequately perfect its lien against both UCB and FDIC because it did not comply
with § 38-1-11. Therefore, Plaintiff did not exhaust its legal remedies and cannot recover on the
basis of quantum meruit. Knight, 748 P.2d at 1100.
Therefore, as a matter of law, the Court grants both defendants' cross-motions for summary
judgment in regard to the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim.
4. RULE 56(f) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Plaintiff VCS has requested more time under rule 56(f) for discover}/. The Court considers
various factors when determining when a rule 56(f) continuance is warranted, including, "an
examination of the party's rule 56(f) affidavit to determine whether the discovery sought will
uncover disputed material facts that will prevent the grant of summary judgment or if the part}/
requesting discover}7 is simply on a 'fishing expedition,'" and "whether the party opposing the
summary judgment motion has had adequate time to conduct discovery and has been conscientious
in pursuing such discovery." Overstock.com, Inc. v. Smartbargains, Inc., 192 P.3d 858 (Utah 2008)
(citing Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co., 145 P.2d 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Furthermore.the
Court will find a requesting party dilator}7 unless the part}7 explains why the evidence could not be
previously obtained and that the evidence sought is not in the requesting party's exclusive control.
Jones v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 146.
Although the Court recognizes that the requirement to file an affidavit "should be applied
liberally," the Court is "unwilling to 'spare litigants from their own lack of diligence."' Callioux, 745
P.2d at 841 (quoting Hebert v. Wichiund, 744 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1984)). In its reply
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memorandum, Plaintiff VCS requested discovery time to determine when Defendant UCB gained
actual knowledge of the mechanic's lien. The Court recognizes that this fact is material and relevant;
however, VCS failed to file an affidavit and did not explain why this information could not be
obtained previously. Furthermore, evidence of whether Plaintiff gave Defendants actual knowledge
of the lawsuit before October 2008 is partially within Plaintiffs control. Therefore, the Court denies
the request for a continuance under rule 56(f).
5. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that there are no issues of genuine fact and
that Defendants UCB and FDIC are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court
denies Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and grants UCB's and FDIC's cross-motions for
summary judgment.
6. ATTORNEY FEES
Pursuant to § 38-1-18, Defendants are awarded reasonable attorneys' fees. Both UCB and
FDIC shall submit affidavits in accordance with rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
regarding each parties' attornej's5 fees, respectivel}'.
Dated this Qty

day of October, 2010.

Michael D. DiRe
District Court Judge
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H. Thomas Stevenson, No. 630:
STEVENSON &. SMITH D .C
3936 Washington 3ivc
Ogder, Utan E^4C3
Teieohone: (801) 399-9910

i-?d

i^QCW.:,'

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNT
VCS, INC.. a Utan Corooration
Plaintiff.

SUMMONS (20 DAY)
i CIVLNO.

C^O'HOUOTT

| JUDGE: °tfe~\ V . ^ . W \ f c

vs.
LA SALLE DEVELOPMENT, LLC
Defendant.

THE STATE Or UTAH i 0 \ H~ A30v r ~ N A M - j DziF-NDANTfS):
LsS-aUe Development. LLC
Ted A. Madsen, Registered Agent
684 E. Vine Street. #2
Murray, UT B4107
^ c : . s „. ^ M c 5 .
You are hereby summoned ano required to file with ine cierk of tns aoove Court
at Seoond District Coun. 2525 Grant Avenue. Ogden. UT &M01. a written Answer to
the attached Complaint, and to serve upon or maii to H. Thomas Stevenson, of
Stevenson & Smith., P.O.. 3985 Washington 3ivd., Ogden. Utah 8^403. Plaintiffs
attorney, a ooov of your Answer within twenty '20) cays after service of this summons
uoon you.
If vou fail to so answer, judgment DV default wili oe taken aaainst vou for the
relief demanded in the Comoiaint which has oeen filed with the cien; of the aoove Coir
and a copy of which is attached anc herewith servec uoon you.
DATED this ;-^- cay of March, 2005

i noFRes^tevenson
Attorney to: Plaintiff
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